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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this important case on the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (as amended 
by the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002) the Supreme Court, by 
a bare majority, allowed the appeal against the decision of a Leasehold 
Valuation Tribunal (LVT) which had been affirmed by, first, the Upper 
Tribunal (Lands Chamber), and, secondly, by the Court of Appeal. Almost all 
long leases of flats contain an obligation on the landlord (or a service 
company) to provide services, such as repairing the exterior and common 
parts of the block, and a concomitant obligation on the tenants to pay service 
charges. The right of the landlord to recover such service charges depends on 
the terms of the particular lease, but the 1985 Act and the Service Charges 
(Consultation Requirements)(England) Regulations 2003 impose certain 
statutory requirements and restrictions on a landlord, which impinge on its 
ability to recover service charges. These requirements are designed to ensure 
that tenants of flats are not required (i) to pay for unnecessary services or 
services which are provided to a defective standard, and (ii) to pay more than 
they should for services which are necessary and have been provided to an 
acceptable standard. 
 
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
Section 19(1) of the 1985 Act provides that in determining the amount of 
a service charge the costs of qualifying works are to be taken into account: 
 
“(a) only to the extent that they are reasonably incurred, and (b) 
…only if the…works are of a reasonable standard.”  
 
∗ Emeritus Professor of Equity, Universities of Bristol and Buckingham. 
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Further, where the costs in any year would result in the service charge 
contribution of any tenant to the cost of the relevant works exceeding £250, 
the landlord cannot recover more than that sum unless, as provided by section 
20(1) of the 1985 Act: 
 
“ the consultation requirements have been either – (a) complied with 
in relation to the works…or (b) dispensed with in relation to the 
works…by (or on appeal from) a leasehold valuation tribunal.” 
 
S 20ZA(1) provides that: 
 
“Where an application is made to a leasehold valuation tribunal for a 
determination to dispense with all or any of the consultation 
requirements in relation to any qualifying works…the tribunal may 
make the determination if satisfied that it is reasonable to dispense 
with the requirements.” 
 
The dispensation may be either prospective or retrospective. In practice it 
has hitherto been very difficult to persuade a LVT to dispense with any of the 
requirements prospectively, and almost impossible to do so retrospectively. 
The consultation requirements are contained in Pt 2 of Sch 4 to the 2003 
Regulations. They are in four stages: 
 
Stage 1. Notice of intention to do the works 
Details of the proposed works must be given to each tenant, allowing at 
least 30 days for observations (to which the landlord must have regard) and 
nomination of possible contractors. 
 
Stage 2. Estimates 
The landlord must seek estimates from, inter alios, nominees of the 
tenants. 
 
Stage 3. Notices about estimates 
The landlord must issue a statement to the tenants with two or more 
estimates (including any nominee’s estimate) and a summary of observations 
and its responses. 30 days must be allowed for further observations, to which 
regard must be had by the landlord. 
 
Stage 4. Notification of reasons 
Unless the chosen contractor is a nominee or submitted the lowest 
estimate, the landlord must make its reasons available to each tenant within 21 
days. 
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FACTS 
 
Daejan Investments Ltd (Daejan) was the owner of premises including 
five flats held on long leases by the five respondents. It proposed to carry out 
works costing over £400,000. It carried out Stages 1 and 2 of the consultation 
requirements but at the original hearing before a LVT it was concluded that 
the landlord had failed to comply with the stage 3 requirements in two 
respects. As Lord Wilson JSC put it, Daejan aborted the Stage 3 requirement 
and thus deprived the tenants of an opportunity to examine the tenders and 
make informed observations thereon. At a further hearing before the LVT the 
issue was whether the requirements should be dispensed with in relation to the 
works pursuant to the provisions contained in ss 20(1)(b) and 20ZA(1) set out 
above. If the landlord was free to enforce the service charge provisions in all 
the leases held by the five respondent tenants, it would be entitled to recover 
just under £280,000 in total from the respondents by way of service charge 
payments in respect of the works, whereas, if no dispensation was granted, it 
would be limited to recovering service charges of £250 per respondent in 
respect of the works, ie a total of £1,250. The LVT decided that it should not 
dispense with the requirements, and its decision was affirmed by the Upper 
Tribunal (Lands Chamber) and subsequently on a further appeal to the Court 
of Appeal. The LVT also rejected a proposal by the landlord that the 
chargeable amount should be reduced by £50,000: in the Court of Appeal 
Gross LJ doubted that the LVT would have been entitled to accede to this 
proposal, and in any event was entitled to reject it.  
  
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 
 
In the Supreme Court Lord Neuberger PSC, with whom Lord Clarke and 
Lord Sumption JJSC agreed, said that three questions of principle arose which 
needed to be answered before it could be decided how the appeal should be 
resolved. These were: (i) the proper approach to be adopted on an application 
under s 20ZA(1) to dispense with compliance with the requirements; (ii) 
whether the decision on such an application must be binary, or whether the 
LVT can grant a s 20(1)(b) dispensation on terms; (iii) the approach to be 
adopted when prejudice is alleged by tenants owing to the landlord’s failure to 
comply with the requirements. 
Lord Neuberger began his consideration of the first question by observing 
that the Act gave little specific guidance as to how a LVT should exercise its 
jurisdiction “to dispense with all or any of the [requirements]” in a particular 
case. The circumstances, he said, in which a s 20ZA(1) application is made 
are almost infinitely various, so any principles that can be derived should not 
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be regarded as representing rigid rules. Taking account of the purpose of the 
requirements as noted above, he expressed the opinion that the issue on which 
a LVT should focus on an application under s 20ZA(1) is the extent, if any, to 
which the tenants were prejudiced by the failure of the landlord to comply 
with the requirements. In a case where it was common ground that the extent, 
quality and cost of the works had in no way been affected by the landlord’s 
failure to comply with the requirements, he found it hard to see why the 
dispensation should not be granted (at least in the absence of some very good 
reason). In such case a dispensation should not be refused solely because the 
landlord seriously breached, or departed from, the requirements. The 
requirements are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. He did not 
consider it convenient or sensible to distinguish in this context, as the LVT, 
Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal all thought appropriate, between “a 
serious failing” and “a technical, minor or excusable oversight”, save in 
relation to the prejudice it causes. On the one hand a “minor or excusable 
oversight” could cause severe prejudice, and on the other hand a gross breach 
might cause the tenants no prejudice. The courts below had been right to 
emphasise the importance of real prejudice to the tenants flowing from the 
landlord’s breach of the requirements: this is, indeed, normally the sole 
question for a LVT when considering how to exercise its jurisdiction. In 
agreement with the courts below, he held that the financial consequences to 
the landlord of not granting a dispensation is not a relevant factor. Lord 
Neuberger further stated that he did not agree with the courts below in so far 
as they supported the proposition that an additional reason for the imposition 
of the consultation requirements was to ensure a degree of transparency and 
accountability when a landlord decides to undertake qualifying works. In his 
opinion the obligations in ss 20 and 20ZA do no more than provide practical 
support for the two purposes identified in s 19(1). 
On the second question the contention of the respondents was that a LVT 
has to choose between two simple alternatives: it must either dispense with 
the requirements unconditionally, or refuse to dispense with the requirements. 
If this contention was correct, then, as the Upper Tribunal held, and the Court 
of Appeal thought probable, it would not have been possible for the LVT to 
grant a dispensation on the terms offered by the landlord, namely a reduction 
of the sum payable by the respondents of £50,000. Lord Neuberger held, 
however, that a LVT is not so constrained when exercising its jurisdiction 
under s 20ZA(1): it has power to grant a dispensation on such appropriate 
terms as it thinks fit. Although a LVT has a very limited power to make an 
order for costs, the terms may include a condition as to costs – eg that the 
landlord pays the tenants’ reasonable costs incurred in connection with the 
landlord’s application for a dispensation. This condition would be a term on 
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which the LVT granted the statutory indulgence of a dispensation to the 
landlord, not a free-standing order for costs. 
Lord Neuberger began his consideration of the third question by observing 
that where the landlord has failed to comply with the requirements, there may 
be a dispute as to whether, and to what extent, the tenants would relevantly 
suffer prejudice if an unconditional dispensation was accorded. The fact that 
this might occasionally involve a difficult exercise was not a valid reason for 
the court refusing to carry it out. He continued by saying that while the legal 
burden of proof – semble, proof that it was reasonable to dispense with the 
requirements – would be, and would remain throughout, on the landlord, the 
factual burden of identifying some relevant prejudice that they would or might 
have suffered would be on the tenants. However given that, ex hypothesi, the 
landlord will have failed to comply with the requirements, a LVT should view 
the tenants’ arguments sympathetically; a further reason for such an approach 
is that the LVT is having to undertake the exercise of reconstructing what 
would have happened, and it is because of the landlord’s failure to comply 
with its duty to the tenants that it is having to do so. For the same reason a 
LVT should be slow to deprive the tenants of the costs of investigating 
relevant prejudice, or seeking to establish that they would suffer such 
prejudice. And once the tenants have shown a credible case for prejudice, the 
LVT should look to the landlord to rebut it.  
  
EFFECT OF CONCLUSIONS ON ABOVE THREE ISSUES 
 
Having set out his conclusions on the three issues raised, Lord Neuberger 
went on to explain their effect. A landlord who fails to comply with the 
statutory requirements must, he said, get a dispensation under s 20(1)(b) if it 
is to recover service charges in respect of the works in a sum greater than the 
statutory minimum. In so far as the tenants will suffer relevant prejudice as a 
result of the landlord’s failure, the LVT should normally require the landlord 
to reduce the amount claimed as service charges to compensate the tenants 
fully for that prejudice. Concern that this could be unduly favourable to the 
landlord by enabling it to buy its way out of its failure to comply with the 
requirements is, he said, answered by the significant disadvantages which the 
landlord would face, ie having to pay (i) the costs of an application to a LVT 
under s 20(1)(b); (ii) the tenants’ reasonable costs in connection with the 
application; (iii) full compensation for any relevant prejudice. The overall 
result would be, (a) the power to dispense with the requirements would be 
exercised in a proportionate way consistent with their purpose; (b) a fair 
balance between (i) ensuring that the tenants do not receive a windfall because 
the power is exercised too sparingly and (ii) ensuring that landlords are not 
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cavalier, or worse, about adhering to the requirements because the power is 
exercised too loosely.  
 
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
Applying the law as noted above Lord Neuberger said that all the courts 
below had adopted the wrong approach to the application for a dispensation. 
This was because (i) they took into account the gravity of the failure not only 
in the prejudice it may have caused to the tenants, but as a free-standing 
matter, (ii) they considered that the mere possibility of prejudice would be 
enough to preclude the grant of a dispensation, and (iii) in the case of the 
Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal they did not consider (or doubted) 
that it was open to the LVT to grant a dispensation on terms, and in the case 
of the LVT that they did not address the question whether the £50,000 
reduction offered by the landlord exceeded any relevant prejudice which the 
tenants could establish. The correct question which the LVT should have 
asked itself was whether the respondents would suffer any relevant prejudice, 
and, if so, what relevant prejudice as a result of the landlord’s failure, if the s 
20(1)(b) dispensation was granted unconditionally. On the facts although 
there was an undoubted failure by the landlord to comply fully with the 
requirements, the relevant prejudice to the respondents of granting the 
dispensation could not be higher than the £50,000 reduction offered by the 
landlord. Accordingly the LVT ought to have decided that the landlord’s 
application for a dispensation should be granted on the terms that (i) the 
respondents’ aggregate liability to pay for the works be reduced by £50,000, 
and (ii) that the landlord pay the reasonable costs of the respondents in so far 
as they reasonably tested its claim for a dispensation and reasonably 
canvassed any relevant prejudice which they might suffer. The appeal was 
accordingly allowed and a dispensation granted on the terms indicated. 
 
DISSENTING OPINIONS 
 
Both Lord Hope DPSC and Lord Wilson JSC gave strong dissenting 
judgments. Lord Hope attached great importance to the fact that the issues to 
which s 20ZA(1) directed attention had been entrusted by statute to an expert 
tribunal. Questions such as whether a landlord’s breach of the consultation 
requirements was “serious” or “technical, minor or excusable” were questions 
of fact and degree best left to the tribunal. Further this was an area of tribunal 
law and practice where it had been recognised, out of respect for the tribunal’s 
expertise, that judicial restraint should be exercised. Though it would 
normally be appropriate for the tribunal to require the tenants to provide some 
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evidence of prejudice (particularly in the case of a minor breach) there could, 
in his opinion, be cases where the breach was so serious that it would on that 
ground alone not be “reasonable”, as put in s 20ZA(1), to dispense with the 
consultation requirements. It should be, he said: 
 
“open to the tribunal to take that view in the interests of preserving the 
integrity of the legislation, and to do so without conducting any such 
inquiry.” 
 
Lord Hope further stated that he was unable to agree with the conclusion 
of the majority that the courts below had been wrong to hold that it should be 
open to the LVT to distinguish, in the exercise of its judgment, between 
breaches or departures according to their level of seriousness, without having 
first to consider the amount of prejudice they may cause or may have caused. 
Of course, he added, the two things may run together, but it would be not be 
right to hold that to separate the two can never be appropriate. 
Lord Wilson expressly disagreed with central aspects of the exposition by 
Lord Neuberger of the principles to be applied by a LVT in its determination 
of an application to dispense with one or more of the consultation 
requirements. In his opinion when Parliament by the 2002 Act inserted the 
new s 20 and the additional s 20ZA into the 1985 Act and accepted the 2003 
Regulations it deliberately imposed requirements which impacted severely on 
landlords. The dispensation is only available to a landlord if he satisfies the 
LVT that it is reasonable to grant it; even if so satisfied the LVT has a 
discretion whether to grant the dispensation; in the absence of compliance or 
dispensation the contribution of each tenant is limited to £250 whatever the 
cost of the works. Lord Wilson’s view was that substantial non-compliance 
with the requirements was, without more, intended to entitle the LVT, in the 
exercise of its discretion, to refuse to dispense with them in order to preserve 
the integrity of the legislation. This view, he said, was supported by a 
consultation paper in relation to a draft of the Regulations which stated that 
the intention of the dispensation procedure was to cover situations where 
consultation was not practicable and to avoid penalising landlords for minor 
breaches of procedure which do not adversely affect service charge payers’ 
interests. In Lord Wilson’s opinion Lord Neuberger’s conclusion that the 
gravity of the landlord’s non-compliance with the requirements is relevant to 
dispensation not of itself but only in so far as it causes financial prejudice to 
the tenant subverts Parliament’s intention. Again disagreeing with Lord 
Neuberger he agreed with the analysis of Lewison J in Paddington Basin 
Developments Ltd v West End Quay Estate Management Ltd 1that one of the 
1 [2010] EWHC 833 (Ch), [2010] 1 WLR 2735. 
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reasons for the imposition of the consultation provisions was to ensure a 
degree of transparency and accountability.  
Both the dissenting judges however agreed with the majority that it was 
open to a LVT to attach a condition such as that proposed by Daejan that it 
would reduce the cost of the works to be charged to the tenant by £50,000. 
The LVT’s expressed reason for rejecting the landlord’s offer of a reduction 
of £50,000 was that it was impossible to assess it in the light of the costs of 
the works already undertaken and of the estimated cost of the works still to be 
undertaken, as to neither of which had the landlord adduced evidence. The 
gravity of the landlord’s non-compliance with the requirements made the 
LVT’s appraisal of any offer extremely difficult. But, Lord Wilson said, with 
the full agreement of Lord Hope, that it was in any event entitled, in its 
discretion, to decline to accept the offered reduction without knowing the 
proportion which it bore to the overall cost of the works. In their view the 
LVT had made no error of law in refusing the landlord’s application for 
dispensation with the requirements and the Upper Tribunal and the Court of 
Appeal had been correct in determining not to set its refusal aside. They 
would, therefore, have dismissed the appeal.  
 
COMMENT 
 
As Gross LJ said in the Court of Appeal:2 “The issue is one of statutory 
construction…” From what has been said above, it seems that the approach of 
the majority to the issue departed from the strict approach applied by the 
minority and the courts below. This is to the effect that non-compliance with 
the consultation requirements, in accordance with the terms of the statutory 
provisions, unless the requirements have been dispensed with by the LVT, has 
the consequence that costs incurred by the landlord above the statutory limit 
are irrecoverable through the service charge. This is so even if they had been 
reasonably incurred and had been incurred in the provision of services, or the 
carrying out of works, to a reasonable standard, and the tenant had suffered no 
prejudice. Lord Wilson, as noted above, in disagreement with the decision of 
the majority, was of opinion that where there had been a serious breach a LVT 
might properly hold that on that ground alone it would not be “reasonable” to 
dispense with the consultation requirements. He recognized that this might 
give rise to a windfall to the tenants and impact severely on the landlord, but 
considered that this severity was testament to the importance which 
Parliament attached to compliance with the requirements. 
Lord Neuberger, on the other hand, giving the decision of the majority, 
was of opinion that one should look more deeply into, and lay more stress on, 
2 [2011] 1 WLR 2320 at 59. 
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the reason for the imposition of the requirements, which in this case, as the 
minority agreed, was the protection of tenants in relation to service charges. In 
his view it was held to follow, as noted above, that normally the sole question 
for the LVT when considering whether it was reasonable to dispense with 
consultation requirements was the real prejudice flowing from the landlord’s 
breach of the requirements. No distinction should be made between a “serious 
failing” and a “technical, minor or excusable oversight” save in relation to the 
prejudice it causes. A dispensation should not be refused by a LVT solely 
because the landlord seriously breached, or departed from, the requirements. 
It remains to be seen whether this more relaxed approach will be extended to 
codes imposing requirements to be fulfilled in other contexts. 
The decision has met with a mixed reception, not surprising in a case 
where the voice of the bare majority in the Supreme Court, which must 
prevail, is in disagreement with all the other judges who have been involved 
in the case. Some applaud the approach of the majority which, in their view, 
produces a sensible result between, as Lord Neuberger put it, on the one hand 
ensuring that tenants do not receive a windfall because the power is exercised 
too sparingly and, on the other hand, ensuring that landlords are not cavalier, 
or worse, about adhering to the requirements because the power is exercised 
too loosely. Others consider that the purpose of Parliament was to protect long 
leaseholders from the doubtful practices of some landlords and they take the 
view that the decision is inconsistent with the integrity of the consultation 
process which is intended to deny relief to landlords who fail to follow the 
correct procedure. Its further intention is to ensure a degree of transparency 
and accountability.  
Landlords have welcomed the decision, but they should not treat it as 
entitling them to disregard the consultation requirements. As noted above 
Lord Neuberger pointed out the landlord would have to pay not 
inconsiderable costs on the application for a dispensation. Landlords should, 
of course, comply with the consultation requirements, but if they have failed 
to do so they would be well advised to seek a dispensation, offering to 
discount the amount of the service by an appropriate amount to compensate 
the leaseholders for any prejudice arising from their failure to comply with the 
consultation requirements.  
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